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The contribution of the European Union (EU) to democratization in post-communist 
Europe was particularly important in countries that experienced domestic contestation 
between liberal-democratic parties and authoritarian and/or nationalist parties (see e.g. 
Schimmelfennig, 2005; Vachudova, 2005). After elections brought liberal-democratic 
parties to power, the conditional incentive of membership locked in democratic 
practices even when former illiberal parties subsequently returned to power. But can 
the EU continue to anchor democracy after a country has obtained membership?  
 
The incentive structure for governments that expect strategic advantages through 
undemocratic practices changes after accession (Epstein and Sedelmeier, 2008, p.798; 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p.676). The sanctions available to EU 
institutions are much weaker than the threat of withholding membership during the 
pre-accession phase. Moreover, the autonomy of EU institutions to sanction breaches 
of liberal democratic principles is more limited than in areas of EU law where the 
                                                
1 For helpful comments, I am grateful to Sabina Avdagic, Tanja Börzel, Rachel Epstein, Wade Jacoby, 
Milada Vachudova, and two anonymous referees. 
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Commission can initiate infringement procedures and the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) can impose financial penalties (Sedelmeier, 2008). Yet despite the danger of 
backsliding that the changing incentive structure after accession evokes, studies 
initially suggested that the EU’s new member states have experienced at best a slow 
down, rather than a reversal, of pre-accession democratic and good governance 
reforms (Levitz and Pop-Eleches, 2010; Pridham, 2008; Sedelmeier, 2012; 
Spendzharova and Vachudova, 2012).  
 
However, political developments in Hungary and Romania since 2012 challenge these 
rather positive findings. In Hungary, the centre-right Alliance of Young Democrats 
(Fidesz) won 52.7 percent of the vote in the 2010 parliamentary election, giving it a 
two-third majority in parliament. This supermajority has enabled Prime Minister (PM) 
Viktor Orban’s government to pass a new constitution – criticized by the Council of 
Europe’s Venice Commission in June 2011 – and numerous statutes. Without 
formally violating the rule of law, they contravene basic principles of liberal 
democratic competition and fundamental freedoms (see e.g. Bánkuti, et al., 2012; 
Scheppele, 2013). The government has concentrated and entrenched its power. It 
weakened notably the constitutional court, seized control of key public institutions (by 
packing them with party loyalists and extending mandates much beyond the term of 
parliament), changed the electoral law, and requires two-thirds majorities to change 
some of its policies. In Romania, a re-alignment of party alliances in May 2012 led to 
a parliamentary majority for PM Victor Ponta’s centre-left Social-Liberal Union 
(USL). In July, the new government suspended the centre-right president, Traian 
Băsescu. Through emergency ordinances it removed constitutional checks on the 
impeachment procedure, including a weakening of the constitutional court and a 
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lifting of the 50 percent participation quorum for the referendum required to validate 
the impeachment (see e.g. Pop-Eleches, 2013). The Venice Commission criticized 
these practices in December 2012.  
 
This article analyzes to what extent the EU has been able to redress the breaches of 
liberal democratic principles in Hungary and Romania in order to understand more 
generally the scope and limits of the EU’s ability to lock-in democratic practices after 
a state has obtained membership. The question of how effectively the EU used the 
instruments at its disposal requires answering two separate questions. First, why did 
the EU forego the use of its most powerful instrument explicitly designed to sanction 
breaches of democratic principles in the member states? Second, how can we explain 
variation in the success of the instruments the EU actually used? 
 
Regarding the first question, what is striking about the EU’s choice of instruments to 
redress democratic backsliding in Hungary and Romania is that it did not use its most 
powerful instrument, namely the sanctions and monitoring of Article 7 TEU that 
allows the member states to withdraw certain membership rights – including voting in 
the Council – for serious and persistent breaches of democratic principles. While the 
fairly rapid agreement of the Romanian PM to the EU’s demands made sanctions 
unnecessary, the non-use against Hungary requires an explanation. Even if we take 
account of the demanding majority requirements to use Article 7 and consider that 
member states would be generally reluctant to use this nuclear option, why did they 
not even agree to use the preventive monitoring mechanism of Article 7? Similarly, if 
we assume that actors are generally reluctant to use Article 7, why did some 
governments and party groups in the European Parliament (EP) advocate its use? The 
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article’s first question is thus how we can understand the variation of actor 
preferences for and against the use of Article 7 and the implications for its use in 
possible future cases. 
 
To explain these preferences, this article identifies four hypotheses that advance 
different expectations about which actor characteristics and context conditions 
predispose actors to support or oppose the use of Article 7. Constructivism suggests 
that these preferences vary depending on the extent of actors’ commitment to liberal 
democracy, and/or their attitudes towards supranational integration. Rationalist 
institutionalism focuses on actors’ strategic use of sanctions to weaken illiberal 
domestic rivals and/or strengthen partisan allies abroad. The article finds that a 
combination of actors’ commitment to liberal democracy and transnational partisan 
politics best explains actors’ preferences regarding the use of Article 7: actors 
opposed Article 7’s use if they had a weaker normative commitment to liberal 
democracy and when the targets of these sanctions were partisan allies abroad. 
Conversely, support for sanctions came both from actors with a strong commitment to 
liberal democracy (regardless of the targets’ partisan orientation) or from actors with a 
weaker commitment to liberal democracy if the sanctions targeted partisan rivals. 
 
Yet despite the EU’s inability to mobilize its strongest instrument, EU institutions had 
some qualified success in using other instruments to press for changes in contentious 
legislation and practices. Especially in the case of Romania, PM Ponta largely 
complied with EU demands. The second question of the article thus concerns the 
effectiveness of the various instruments that the EU used across countries and issues. 
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Why was the EU better at stopping backsliding in Romania than in Hungary? And 
how can we explain differences across issue areas in Hungary? 
 
To answer these questions, the article contrasts rationalist institutionalist and 
constructivist explanations that attribute variation in the EU’s success respectively to 
differences in its material leverage and to the presence of factors conducive to the use 
of social pressure. The analysis suggests that the EU is not necessarily powerless 
against democratic backsliding. The size of material threats that the EU can make 
through infringement procedures and issue-linkage matter, but the range of issues and 
countries to which they can be applied is limited. The Romanian case suggests that 
governments are susceptible to social pressure if the conditions are favourable. But 
even then, social pressure might need to be applied in the shadow of material 
sanctions through issue linkage in order for the target government to redress breaches 
of democratic practice. 
 
I. The Article 7 sanctioning mechanism against breaches of democracy 
 
The EU’s main instruments against general breaches of democratic principles are 
contained in Article 7. Although the member states also had concerns in the 
Mediterranean enlargements of the 1980s that post-authoritarian new member states 
might be susceptible to set-backs after accession (Wallace, 1996), they only created 
the possibility of sanctions in the context of the eastern enlargement (Sadurski, 2012, 
pp.81-4). The Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 established a sanctioning mechanism for 
infringements of the values referred to in Article 2 – ‘respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including 
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the rights of persons belonging to minorities’ as well as ‘pluralism, non-
discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men’. If 
the EU establishes that there is a ‘serious and persistent breach’ of these values by a 
member state, the Council can agree by qualified majority to suspend certain treaty 
rights of that state, including its voting rights. However, the determination of such a 
breach is very demanding. It requires a proposal by either one third of the member 
states or the Commission, the consent of the EP (by a 2/3 majority of votes cast if 
representing a majority of MEPs) and unanimous agreement in the European Council 
(not counting abstentions or the member state accused). The Treaty of Nice added a 
preventive procedure (with less demanding majority requirements) to determine the 
existence of ‘a clear risk’ of a serious breach of liberal democratic principles. It can be 
proposed by either one third of the member states, the Commission, or the EP and 
requires the consent of the EP and a four-firth majority in the Council (minus 
abstentions and the member state concerned). 
 
By 2012, the EU had never used Article 7. The closest it came to sanctioning a 
member state was in 2000 when the centre-right Austrian People’s Party formed a 
coalition government with the populist radical-right Freedom Party (FPÖ). It is 
important to note that the sanctions used in this case were not EU measures – let alone 
based on Article 7 (as is occasionally wrongly suggested, see e.g. EUobserver, 
06.07.2012). Instead, the other member states adopted bilateral, albeit coordinated 
diplomatic sanctions against the Austrian government. Another peculiarity of this case 
was that the concerns did not focus on an actual breach of the EU’s fundamental 
values, but on their incompatibility with those of the FPÖ and its leader, Jörg Haider. 
The dissatisfaction with how the Austrian case was handled and the limitations of the 
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treaty framework for dealing with such a case led to the inclusion of the preventive 
mechanism to establish the risk of a serious breach in the Treaty of Nice.  
 
The cases of Hungary and Romania in 2012 are more clear-cut for the use of Article 
7. The rapid acquiescence of the Romanian government to the EU’s demands can 
explain why the EU did not need to use Article 7 there, but why did it not do so 
against Hungary? Maybe the very demanding majority requirements make this 
outcome appear not particularly surprising. At the same time, given the member 
states’ willingness to sanction the Austrian government in 2000 on much weaker 
grounds, it seems striking that the EU could not even muster the less demanding 
majority to determine a ‘risk’ of a serious breach in Hungary. Moreover, even if we 
generally consider governments to be highly reluctant to use this ‘nuclear option’, 
some governments and EP groups did advocate the use of Article 7. How we can 
account for such variation in actors’ preferences? A better understanding of these 
preferences is instructive for a more general explanation of the EU’s ability to use 
sanctions in other cases of democratic backsliding that might arise. 
 
II. Theoretical framework to explain actor preferences towards the use of 
sanctions 
 
Drawing on the debate between rationalist institutionalism and constructivism, we can 
derive from each approach two main propositions about the context and 
characteristics of actors that incline them either to oppose or support sanctions against 
member states that breach liberal democratic principles. Despite the obvious 
differences, the case of sanctions against Austria in 2000 is instructive for analysing 
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actors’ preferences across member states and EP party groups concerning the use of 
Article 7 more generally. It suggests that rationalism and constructivism not only 
provide competing but also potentially complementary explanations for the support 
and opposition to sanctions (Merlingen, et al., 2001).  
 
Rationalist institutionalism: domestic and international partisan politics 
 
A rationalist perspective suggests two different types of partisan motives for actors to 
support or oppose the use of Article 7. The first focuses on the instrumental use of EU 
measures to constrain domestic partisan opponents (for such an argument for the 
creation of the ECHR, see Moravcsik, 2000). In the Austrian case of 2000, (intra-
party) partisan politics explain why certain governments took the lead in mobilizing 
support for sanctions (Merlingen, et al., 2001, pp.67-70). In France and Belgium, EU-
level measures to punish cooperation between centre-right and extreme right parties 
strengthened the positions of Jacques Chirac and Guy Verhofstad against intra-party 
rivals who were open to cooperation with the extreme right.  
 
If the issue at stake is not cooperation with extremist parties, but violations of 
democratic practices by the government,2 parties that face illiberal domestic 
competitors have incentives to use international sanctions against violators of 
democratic practices elsewhere. These governments might fear that their rivals would 
use undemocratic practices to obtain or preserve power and can be expected to 
support EU-level sanctions to counter this threat. The domestic partisan politics 
                                                
2 The Austrian case has less similarity with Hungary and Romania in 2012 than with Slovakia in 2006 
when the social democratic Smer-SD formed a coalition government with the extreme-nationalist 
Slovak National Party, leading to the expulsion of Smer-SD from the EP’s S&D party group. 
 9 
hypothesis thus suggests that a member state government supports sanctions if the 
opposition parties’ normative commitment to liberal democratic values is weak. 
 
The second type of partisan incentives relates to the left-right cleavage in party 
politics. Parties are likely to advocate international sanctions against their ideological 
adversaries in other member states and to be more permissive of democratic 
backsliding within their own party family. In this case, the incentives are not from 
domestic political competition. Supporting like-minded parties abroad increases the 
likelihood of achieving international cooperation close to a government’s ideological 
position. The international partisan politics hypothesis is therefore that a member 
state government (EP political group) supports sanctions if it is ideologically distant 
from the government party of the target state. 
 
Constructivism: normative commitment to democracy and to supranational 
governance 
 
Constructivism draws attention to two characteristics of actors that can explain their 
support or opposition to sanctions: actors’ normative commitment to liberal 
democracy and supranational integration respectively. With regard to the former, 
actors can be expected to support sanctions if they have a strong normative 
commitment to upholding liberal democratic principles. A strong normative 
consensus should lead to an agreement to use the full force of available instruments 
against deficiencies within the EU. At the same time, variation in the strength of this 
commitment across actors can be expected to lead to divergent preferences regarding 
the use of sanctions.  
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Again, the Austrian case is instructive for the significance of normative consensus. 
Partisan incentives might explain who was at the forefront of advocating sanctions, 
but they cannot explain why all other member states followed suit. Some governments 
were sceptical about the appropriateness and effectiveness of the proposed sanctions, 
but consented to the measures because of the strong normative salience of the values 
in reference to which they were framed as appropriate behaviour (Merlingen, et al., 
2001, pp.62-5). Concerns about the effectiveness of Article 7 to restore democratic 
practices – after all, in Austria the sanctions in 2000 did increase the government’s 
domestic support – mean that a normative commitment might not be incompatible 
with opposition to using Article 7, but from a constructivist perspective it could still 
explain support for it. The liberal democratic norms hypothesis therefore suggests 
that a member state government (EP party group) supports sanctions if it has a strong 
normative commitment to liberal democratic values. 
 
Constructivism also draws attention to a second explanatory factor. Actors’ attitudes 
towards sanctions might also depend on their general attitudes towards European 
integration. If actors’ identities are incompatible with the idea of supranational 
governance, they are likely to reject the use of EU sanctions as illegitimate 
interference in domestic affairs. Thus, even if they had strong partisan incentives or a 
commitment to democratic norms, actors would only support sanctions if they 
consider European integration normatively appropriate. The supranational 
integration hypothesis therefore suggests that a member state government (EP party 









This article assesses these partly competing, partly complementary explanations 
through a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) (Ragin, 2008; 
Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). The units of analysis, or cases, are key actors in the 
EU’s decision to impose sanctions – member state governments and EP party groups 
– and their support or opposition to sanctions against Hungary or Romania. The 
outcome to be explained is these actors’ position with regard to sanctions. The 
explanatory conditions are the actors’ political orientation pertaining to the above 
hypotheses.  
 
Expert surveys provide information about these political orientations of (government) 
parties in the member states (Bakker, et al., forthcoming) and EP political groups 
(McElroy and Benoit, 2012). With regard to partisan politics, actors’ ideological 
distance from target government is assessed according to their general left/right 
orientation. Their normative commitment to supranational governance is expressed in 
their attitudes towards European integration. As a proxy for a party’s commitment to 
liberal democracy, this article uses their ‘ideological stance on democratic freedoms 
and rights’. Bakker et al. (forthcoming) describe the poles of this dimension in 
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composite terms on a continuum from a green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) 
orientation to a traditional/authoritarian/nationalist (TAN) orientation.3 
 
Unfortunately, data limitations prevent us from testing all four hypotheses 
systematically. Since no formal proposal to use Article 7 was submitted and voted on, 
we do not have comprehensive information on the positions of all member states. 
However, the EP voted on two resolutions that expressed serious concern about the 
new Hungarian constitution. These resolutions in combination with media reports 
(Agence Europe, 6.7.2011; 17.2.2012) allow us to infer the positions of the EP party 
groups: ALDE, Greens, S&D, and United Left supported the possibility of sanctions, 
while EPP and ECR were against and EFP abstained.4 The systematic data for EP 
party groups can be complemented by less systematic data from media reports that 
suggest that among the member state governments, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg5 we attempting to mobilise support for sanctions (EUObserver, 
16.2.2012). Moreover, we can increase the leverage of the analysis by including 
additional data about actors’ preferences in the case of Romania, based on media 
reports. Leaders of EP party groups and governments who voiced their concerns and 
publicly considered the possibility of Article 7 if the problems persisted include the 
German government (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12.7.2012) and the following party 
                                                
3 For further information on the relevant survey questions, calibration of the data for the analysis, and 
the detailed results of the fsQCA analysis, please see the Methodological Annex available on the 
author’s personal webpage. 
4 On 5 July 2011, the EP adopted by 331 votes to 274 with 54 abstentions a resolution on the revised 
Hungarian constitution tabled by the S&D, GUE/NGL, Greens/EFA and ALDE groups. On 16 
February 2012 it adopted by 315 votes to 263 against with 49 abstentions a resolution on recent 
political developments in Hungary tabled by the same groups, after defeating two motions for a 
resolution tabled respectively by the EPP and ECR. Although there were no roll-call votes for either 
resolution, the records identify the groups that tabled them and those submitting counter-resolutions. 
5 Luxembourg is not covered in the survey by Bakker et al. (2012). 
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groups: EPP (EUObserver, 6.7.2013), S&D (Agence Europe, 11.7.2012), ALDE 
(Agence Europe, 19.7.2012), Greens (Agence Europe, 31.7.2012).  
 
Adding data on Romania – where the Centre-left formed the government – allows us 
to make better inferences about the role of ideological distance. In the case of 
Hungary’s centre-right government, actors with a TAN orientation also tended to be 
ideologically close (on a general left-right dimension) to the target government, which 
makes it difficult to distinguish whether their opposition to sanctions is due to 
ideological proximity or lack of a GAL orientation. The drawback of adding the less 
systematic data is that while it provides us with a fuller picture of actors who support 
sanctions, there is a possible bias in that actors supporting sanctions are 
overrepresented in our sample. While the findings about the impact of actors’ political 
orientations on their attitudes towards sanctions should be generalisable beyond the 
cases analyzed, in the absence of more comprehensive data, we should interpret them 
with caution. Moreover, the lack of systematic data about member state governments 
means that we cannot assess the domestic partisan hypothesis – which is specific to 
national governments rather than transnational party groups.6 The following analysis 
thus assesses the remaining three hypotheses that apply equally to party groups and 




                                                
6 Anecdotal support for this hypothesis could be that among the three governments alleged to garner 
support for sanctions against Hungary, two (the Netherlands and Belgium) face strong parties of the 
radical/populist right domestically. 
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Table 1: Actor characteristics and support for Article 7 against Hungary  
  and Romania 














Support (1) or 
opposition (2) 
to sanctions 
United Left (HU) 15.1 10.86 6.1 1 
Greens (HU) 17.3 9.36 12.7 1 
Greens (RO) 17.3 1.6 12.7 1 
S&D (HU) 14.7 5.96 12.6 1 
S&D (RO) 14.7 1.8 12.6 1 
ALDE (HU) 15.8 1.86 13.9 1 
ALDE (RO) 15.8 5.9 13.9 1 
EPP (HU) 6.3 0.26 12.1 0 
EPP (RO) 6.3 7.5 12.1 1 
ECR (HU) 4.7 3.34 1.8 0 
EFD (HU) 3.6 4.84 0.1 0.43 
Netherlands (HU) 8.52 0.69 12.31 1 
Belgium (HU) 11.07 4.34 17.87 1 
Germany (RO) 8.78 6.77 16.11 1 
1 The letters in brackets indicate whether the target government is Hungary 
(HU) or Romania (RO). 
2 On a scale from 0-20. 
3 Abstention 
 
Analysis and findings: explanations of actor positions regarding the use of Article 7 
 
Table 1 presents for each of the actors included in the analysis the raw data with 
regard to the three explanatory conditions (ideological distance to target governments; 
normative commitment to liberal democratic norms; normative commitment to 
supranational integration) and their support for sanctions in the case of Hungary 
and/or Romania. The fsQCA results in two equifinal solutions for the outcome 
‘support for sanctions’ (parsimonious solution that makes simplifying assumptions 
about configurations of cases that the sample does not cover). Actors support sanction 
either if they are committed to the values of liberal democracy (i.e. have a GAL 
orientation) or if they are ideologically distant from the target government. Actors’ 
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attitudes towards European integration do not affect their support for sanctions. This 
result has both a very high consistency (0.96) and coverage (0.85). Conversely, the 
analysis produces one single explanation for the opposition to sanctions (identical 
results for the parsimonious, intermediate and complex solution): actors that are not 
strongly committed to liberal democracy (i.e. have a TAN orientation) oppose 
sanctions against target governments to which they are ideologically close (with 
regard to their left-right orientation). Although this solution has a high coverage 
(0.83), its consistency is fairly low (0.56). The outlier is the Dutch government (which 
supported sanctions against Hungary although it has a TAN orientation and is 
ideologically close), which decreases the consistency of the result considerably, given 
the small number of cases of explicit opposition to sanctions. However, if we analyze 
only the EP party groups with regard to Hungary – for which we have comprehensive 
data – then the consistency of this explanation for opposition to sanctions increases to 
0.94. 
 
In other words, while (transnational) partisan politics do play a role in actors’ 
decisions about whether to support the use of Article 7, this decision cannot be 
reduced to this factor. Instead, actors’ normative commitment to liberal democracy 
appears to condition whether partisanship matters. Actors with a normative 
commitment to liberal democracy support sanctions against member states that breach 
democracy, irrespective of their partisan orientation. Partisan orientation only matters 
if an actor does not have a strong commitment to liberal democracy (i.e. has a TAN 
orientation): these actors will support sanctions against ideological rivals abroad and 
to oppose them if they target their partisan allies. 
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IV. Alternative instruments against democratic backsliding and analytical 
framework for their effectiveness. 
 
Alternative instruments: social pressure, infringement procedures, and issue-linkage 
 
Instead of using Article 7, the EU used (combinations of) three different measures in 
order to bring about changes in specific practices and legislation that infringed liberal 
democratic principles in Hungary and Romania. Social pressure is an instrument 
widely used by international institutions. It involves public criticism and shaming of 
non-compliant governments (see e.g. Johnston, 2001), and it can be preceded by less 
public efforts to persuade target governments of the normative appropriateness of 
compliance (see e.g. Checkel, 2001). EU institutions used social pressure towards 
both Hungary and Romania across the range of issues.  
 
EU institutions can use the general infringement procedure of Articles 258 and 260 
against non-compliance with a few specific values covered in Articles 2 and 7 TEU 
that also have their own legal basis in the treaty or secondary law – such as non-
discrimination (on grounds of gender, age, ethnic origin, etc). The Commission can 
launch infringement procedures autonomously and the ECJ can ultimately impose 
financial penalties against persistent non-compliance (see e.g. Börzel, 2001). In the 
case of Hungary, the Commission launched infringement procedures concerning three 
issues: the independence of the central bank, of the data protection authority, and the 
reduction of the retirement age of judges. 
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Apart from the legal instruments explicitly intended to allow EU institutions to rectify 
infringements of liberal democratic principles, the EU might be able to use issue 
linkage to increase its leverage over non-compliant member states. EU institutions or 
member states can make more or less explicit links between non-compliance and the 
threat of withholding rewards for that member states in another issue area. The 
possibility of creating issue linkages depends on the issues and countries concerned. It 
is particularly strong if the member state in question has intensive preferences for an 
agreement in another policy area that requires unanimity between the member states. 
The potential for issue-linkage was particularly high in Romania. It was one of the 
few member states that had not yet been granted membership in the Schengen area, 
and was alongside Bulgaria the only country that was subject to post-accession 
monitoring through the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) that 
regularly assesses progress in the fight against corruption, organized crime, and 
judicial reform. Some member states, including the Netherlands and Germany, have 
linked their approval of Schengen membership to progress with the CVM, although it 
is not a formal membership requirement. The Commission has linked breaches in the 
rule of law in Romania to continued CVM monitoring, and made negotiations on an 
IMF loan for Hungary dependent on restoring the independence of the central bank. 
The EU’s initial suspension in March 2012 of 495 million Euros in structural funds 
for Hungary – as the first member state to be punished for failing to meet the budget 
deficit limits – was also seen as an attempt to increase the pressure on the Hungarian 
government. 
 
Theoretical framework: the impact of the EU’s instruments in Hungary and Romania 
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The article distinguishes between two mechanisms to explain (variation in) the 
effectiveness of the EU’s attempts to bring about domestic changes that redress 
breaches of democracy in member states. Rationalist institutionalism focuses on target 
actors’ susceptibility to material incentives. The key instruments that rely on this 
mechanism are infringement procedures and issue-linkage, which both entail the 
threat of material sanctions. According to this explanation, the EU’s ability to bring 
about domestic change depends primarily on the target government’s vulnerability to 
the threatened sanctions and the costliness of the changes demanded by EU 
institutions. Thus, according to a material leverage hypothesis, target governments 
carry out the domestic changes demanded by the EU if the costs of threatened EU 
sanctions exceed the domestic adjustment costs.  
 
Constructivism focuses on social pressure as the key mechanism leading to domestic 
change. Target governments change undemocratic rules and practices either because 
the EU persuades them that this constitutes appropriate behaviour for community 
members, or if they are susceptible to social sanctions. Factors that affect target 
governments’ perceptions of legitimacy and susceptibility to shaming relate both to 
the EU’s practice and to the characteristics of their target (see e.g. Checkel, 2001; 
Epstein, 2008; Johnston, 2001). Social pressure is more likely to succeed if the 
government leader is a ‘novice’ in international relations; and if she has a positive 
normative attachment to the EU. The perceived legitimacy of the EU’s demands is 
higher if they follow general standards of procedural legitimacy; if the demands are 
initially conveyed in a process of non-hierarchical arguing about appropriate 
standards; if they are externally validated through an independent institution (e.g. the 
Council of Europe’s Venice Commission); and if there is internal consensus about the 
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demands. The social pressure hypothesis suggests that target governments carry out 
the domestic changes demanded by the EU if they perceive these demands as 
legitimate. 
 
V. Analysis and findings: effectiveness of EU instruments against democratic 
backsliding in Hungary and Romania 
 
In Hungary, the EU’s attempts to stem democratic backsliding focused in particular 
on the independence of the media, of the data protection authority, and of the central 
bank, as well as on the retirement age of judges. For Romania, the Commission 
prepared an 11-point list of demands that centred on the validity requirements for the 
referendum to impeach President Băsescu, as well as the independence of the 
judiciary and the fight against corruption.  
 
The explanatory factors for the effectiveness of the EU’s attempts varied across issues 
and countries, with regard to both the EU’s ability to threaten material sanctions (and 
the magnitude of its material leverage) and the conditions for the use of social 
pressure. The domestic conditions for social pressure were much more favourable in 
Romania than in Hungary. The 39-year old Ponta was a relative ‘novice’ to political 
leadership and international relations while Orban had a longstanding history as party 
leader and previous PM. Attitudes towards the EU are generally much more positive 
in Romania than they are in Hungary, and among Fidesz voters in particular. While 
there is a general desire to be recognized as ‘good Europeans’ among Romanian elites 
and public, Orban regularly used scathing criticism of the EU to shore up domestic 
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support.7 Finally, for the Romanian government, relinquishing undemocratic practices 
that removed constraints on the exercise of power was strategically costly, but did not 
affect normative beliefs. By contrast, Orban held a deep normative commitment to the 
goals underpinning his government’s hold on power, reflected in framing the 
constitutional changes as the final steps in his long struggle to overcome communism 
in Hungary. 
 
Table 2: Overview of EU instruments and outcomes 
Country Issue Instruments & leverage 
(in addition to social 
pressure) 
Outcome (compliance 
with EU demands) 
Hungary Media law (Social pressure only) Minor compliance 
 Central Bank independence Infringement procedure 
(threat of ECJ fines); 
issue-linkage (IMF loan) 
Compliance 
 Independence of the Data 
Protection Authority 
Infringement procedure 
(threat of ECJ fines) 
Incremental compliance 
 Retirement age of judges As above Incremental compliance 
 
Romania Independency of judiciary  Issue linkage: CVM (rule 
of law), Schengen 
membership 
Compliance 
 Quorum and validation of 
impeachment referendum 
As above Compliance 
 Corruption control  As above Partial compliance 
 
                                                
7 For example, ‘Hungarians will not live as foreigners dictate, will not give up their independence or 
their freedom, therefore they will not give up their constitution either’ (Guardian 16.3.2012). 
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Table 2 (above) presents an overview of the variation across different issues in the 
material leverage that the EU used (in addition to social pressure) and the outcomes 
with regard to the target government’s compliance with the EU’s demands. 
 
Hungary: Media law; retirement age of judges; independence of the Data Protection 
Authority, and of the Central Bank in Hungary 
 
The Hungarian Media law, adopted in 2011, was heavily criticized by a number of 
member states, EP party groups and the Commission (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
29.12.2010; 2.1.2012). Among other contentious elements, it established a new Media 
Council – whose five members on a 9-year term only include Fidesz supporters. It is 
in charge of licensing and tendering, the appointment of directors of public outlets, 
and can impose high fines on media outlets whose coverage is judged not to be 
‘politically balanced’, raising concerns about self-censorship. Although the 
Commission made the debateable claim that the media law breached the EU media 
directive, it decided not to use infringement procedures (Agence Europe, 18.1.2012). 
Instead, Commissioner Neelie Kroes was satisfied that the Commission’s concerns 
had been addressed in an exchange of letters with the Hungarian government, which 
promised to ease rules for foreign media and to soften the rules against ‘unbalanced’ 
coverage and ‘offensive’ internet content (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 7.3.2011; 
EUObserver, 17.1.2012).  
 
After the Hungarian Constitutional Court declared some elements of the media law 
unconstitutional, the controversy reignited when the Media Council withdrew the 
frequency for Klubradio, the main independent radio channel in the country, leading 
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to criticism from the Commission, although there was no EU law that allowed it to act 
(Agence Europe, 18.1.2012). A Budapest court granted a temporary relief for 
Klubradio to stay on air (European Voice, 27.3.2012), but according to a Council of 
Europe expertise on the Hungarian Media law, the government’s changes still do not 
meet European human rights standards. Freedom of the press remains problematic 
since the Media Council ‘still controls the entire broadcast sector and has … [the] 
legal power to reregulate print and online media (Bánkuti, et al., 2012).’ In sum, the 
EU’s use of social pressure to achieve greater plurality and independence of the media 
was largely ineffective. 
 
In January 2012, the Commission started infringement procedures against Hungarian 
legislation in three issue areas that had a separate basis in EU law. The lowering of 
the retirement age of judges from 70 to 62 (used to replace a generation of judges with 
new party-loyal judges) infringed Directive 2000/78/EC on equal treatment in 
employment. Measures to restrict the independence of the national data protection 
supervisory authority and of the Hungarian Central Bank respectively breached 
Article 16 TFEU and Directive 95/46/EC on data protection and Article 130 TFEU. 
Moreover, concerning the independence of the Central Bank, the EU did not only use 
the infringement procedures – with the threat of financial penalties by the ECJ – but 
additionally used issue linkage. In December 2011, the EU and the IMF both made 
negotiations on 15-20 billion Euros in financial assistance dependent on restoring the 
independence of the Central Bank (Agence Europe, 4.1.2012). In April 2012, the 
Commission declared itself satisfied with the changes to the Central Bank’s legal 
status, but not in the other two cases and referred Hungary to the ECJ. These cases 
continued in early 2013, although the Hungarian government had agreed to comply 
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with the ECJ judgements establishing infringements (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
30.1.2013). 
 
Romania: independence of the judiciary, of the anti-corruption institutions and 
quorum requirements for the referendum to impeach the president 
 
In contrast to the Hungarian case, the EU moved fairly quickly after the Romanian 
government had impeached president Băsescu and took measures limiting the powers 
of the constitutional court to scrutinize its attempt to change the 50 percent 
participation quorum in the referendum required to confirm the impeachment. 
Commission President Barroso and Council President Van Rompuy both arranged a 
meeting with Ponta in Brussels on 12 July 2012. Barroso obtained a commitment 
from Ponta to comply with a list of 11 measures that the Commission deemed 
necessary to restore the rule of law (Agence Europe, 14.7.2012). 
 
These measures broadly address three issues. First, measures to respect the 
independency of judiciary, including compliance with constitutional court decisions; 
reinstatement of powers of the court; and to refrain from using emergency ordinances, 
publishing judicial decisions selectively in the Official Journal, and criticising judicial 
decisions and intimidating judges. The second main issue was respecting the 50 
percent turnout requirement to validate the impeachment referendum. The third set of 
measures centred on the issue of corruption control, including the independence of the 
Ombudsman, Prosecutor, and anti-corruption agency; resignation of ministers and 
MPs convicted of corruption; and the non-use of interim presidential pardons. 
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Ponta quickly declared his willingness to comply with the demands, and eventually 
recognized that the referendum to impeach the president had failed – despite 
overwhelming approval by 97 percent of voters – since the turnout was only 46 
percent, largely due to the opposition’s strategy of boycotting the referendum (Agence 
Europe, 31.7.2012). At the same time, despite the broad compliance by the Ponta 
government with the EU’s demands, the CVM report of 30 January 2013 criticized 
remaining shortcomings with corruption control, especially that individuals under 
investigation for corruption took office as ministers and MPs after the government’s 
overwhelming victory in the December 2012 election (EUObserver, 30.1.2012). 
 
The EU’s influence in the Romanian case relied heavily on social pressure, although it 
was carried out in the shadow of explicit and implicit issue linkage. The political 
crisis in Romania coincided with the scheduled publication of the CVM report on 
Romania on 18 July. Although CVM does not usually cover an assessment of the rule 
of law, the Commission focused strongly on the concerns that the crisis raised for the 
functioning of democracy and the rule of law. It concluded that further monitoring 
through the CVM was necessary. However, a further – although much less explicit – 
issue linkage concerned Romania’s aspiration to Schengen membership. Although the 
Commission had stated repeatedly that both Romania and Bulgaria met the conditions 
for membership, initially the Dutch and Finnish governments indicated that they 
would block an agreement until the two countries had demonstrated more progress 
with the issues covered by the CVM – corruption control, reform of the judiciary and 
the fight against organized crime – although the CVM did not envisage such a link to 
Schengen accession. Following the Romanian crisis, the German and French 
governments also stated their intention to link these issues. 
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Findings: conditions for the effectiveness of EU pressure 
 
A comparison of the outcomes of the EU’s attempts to bring about changes in 
domestic practices shows that the main variation in the EU’s success is across 
countries. The EU’s influence was generally effective in Romania, but much less so in 
Hungary where the EU anyway addressed the breaches of liberal democracy only 
highly selectively. But there is also some intra-country variation across issues. In 
Hungary, the EU had much less influence on the media law than the three issues that 
were subject to infringement procedures, and among the latter, compliance was much 
faster regarding Central Bank independence than the other two issues. In Romania, 
despite generally good compliance, shortcomings remained with regard to the EU’s 
demands for corruption control. 
 
How can we explain these patterns and what do they tell us about the relative 
importance of material leverage and social pressure? The cross-issue variation within 
countries supports the material leverage hypothesis. In Hungary, the EU’s influence 
was weakest on the issue where it only used social pressure, while compliance was 
fastest on the issue where the EU could use issue linkage to IMF aid in addition to its 
infringement procedure. In Romania, the more problematic compliance with regard to 
corruption control arguably concerns the issue in which the costs of compliance with 
the EU’s demands are highest.  
 
Unfortunately, in the cross-country variation, the EU’s greater influence in Romania 
is overdetermined. Conditions in Romania were much more conducive to the effective 
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use of social pressure, but at the same time, the EU’s potential material leverage was 
also much greater through the possible issue-linkage to Schengen membership. In the 
absence of clearer evidence to assess the respective causal impact of social pressure 
and issue-linkage in Romania, a cautious interpretation of the outcome is that EU 
pressure can be effective even without Article 7, but only if the conditions for both 
social pressure and material sanctions are favourable. These are demanding 
conditions.  
 
However, even if the currently available evidence does not allow us to decide whether 
both mechanisms were necessary, or whether either would have been by itself 
sufficient, counterfactual reasoning might give reason for optimism that under 
favourable conditions for social pressure, material leverage might not be necessary. 
For Romania, issue-linkage was only explicitly established to CVM. But CVM is a 
social sanction; it operates through the stigma attached to continued monitoring and 
scrutiny. Negative CVM reports do not entail significant material sanctions, only the 
non-recognition of national court decisions in other member states. The link to 
Schengen membership suggested by some member states was repeatedly denounced 
by the Commission as illegitimate, although the unanimity requirement still made it a 
real threat. However, this link predated the Romanian crisis of 2012, yet it had still 
not led to the necessary reforms in either Romania or Bulgaria. It is therefore 
debateable whether the threat of withholding Schengen membership motivated the 
Romanian government to change undemocratic practices since such compliance by 
itself did not guarantee Schengen membership, which still required separate progress 
with corruption control that the Romanian government had been unable to deliver. 
Thus while the cautious interpretation is that the EU can only effectively counteract 
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democratic backsliding without Article 7 if very demanding conditions for both social 
and material sanctions are present, there is reason for cautious optimism that 




Can EU membership lock-in democracy in post-authoritarian states? Can the EU 
remedy democratic backsliding after accession? This article has analyzed the cases of 
Hungary and Romania in 2012/13 to answer these broader questions. These cases 
raise two key questions: how can we explain that the EU did not use its most powerful 
sanction mechanism against breaches of liberal democracy, namely Article 7? And 
why were alternative instruments generally more successful in Romania than 
Hungary, as well as more effective on some issues than others? 
 
Available data on the positions of EP party groups and member state governments 
towards using Article 7 against Hungary or Romania suggests that a combination of 
partisan politics and weak normative consensus is an important constraint on the use 
of this sanctioning mechanism. Actors with a weaker normative commitment to 
liberal democracy (expressed in a traditional/authoritarian/nationalist orientation) 
appear reluctant to sanction governments formed by their partisan allies (i.e. who are 
ideologically close on the left-right dimension). Conversely, actors normatively 
committed to liberal democratic principles (reflected in a green/alternative/libertarian 
orientation) support sanctions irrespective of the target government’s ideological 
orientation, while those with a TAN orientation support them (only) against their 
ideological rivals abroad. If we can generalize from our sample, then an agreement on 
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sanctions need not require that the Council is exclusively composed of governments 
with a GAL orientation, depending on the partisan orientation of the target 
government. Since a GAL orientation is generally more likely among parties on the 
left of the general left-right dimension, this might imply that democratic backsliding 
is more likely to be punished in countries that are governed by parties of the left rather 
than the right.  
 
Despite the EU’s inability to mobilize its strongest instrument, EU institutions had 
some success in pressing for changes in undemocratic practices. Especially in the case 
of Romania, PM Ponta largely complied with EU demands. In Hungary, the EU’s 
influence was generally much more limited. Its failure to use Article 7 left the broader 
underlying problems unchallenged and only addressed selected issues in isolation (see 
also Jenne and Mudde, 2012, p.150). On such issues, however, the EU achieved some 
incremental changes.  
 
The intra-country cross-issue variation of the EU’s influence supports the claim that 
variation in the EU’s material leverage affects its ability to elicit compliance with its 
demands. Especially when the conditions for social pressure were unfavourable – as 
in Hungary – social pressure alone was largely ineffective, while the threat of fines by 
the ECJ led to compliance, particularly if it was combined through issue linkage with 
the threat of withholding other benefits (i.e. the IMF loan). The main exceptions to 
Romania’s compliance with EU demands concerned corruption control. These were 
arguably the most costly and a key motivation to remove checks on the government’s 
autonomy in the first place. This cross-issue variation confirms the expectation of the 
material leverage hypothesis that the EU’s influence depends both on the size of the 
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material sanctions that it can threaten and the size of the domestic costs of 
compliance. This finding underscores concerns about the EU’s ability to redress 
illiberal practices in its membership given the difficulties to agree on the use of 
Article 7, the limited extent to which liberal democratic principles also have a 
separate legal basis that allows the use of EU infringement procedures, and the fact 
that many possibilities of issue-linkage that the Romanian and Hungarian cases 
offered–with regard to Schengen membership, an IMF loan, or the possible 
withholding of regional funds due to excessive deficits –do not generally apply to all 
EU member states. 
 
We have insufficient empirical evidence to assess in the Romanian case the respective 
causal impact of the favourable conditions for social pressure and of the material 
leverage through the implicit possibility of denying Schengen membership. A 
cautious interpretation therefore suggests that the EU might only be able to rectify 
post-accession backsliding under a very demanding constellation of conditions that 
allow it to apply both social and material pressure. This interpretation would lead us 
to a rather pessimistic assessment of the EU’s ability to counteract democratic 
backsliding in its members, not least since the scope for issue-linkage is much more 
limited with regard to most other member states that are already members of 
Schengen. However, since Romania’s accession to Schengen remains independently 
blocked by some member states due to the limited progress with corruption control, 
fight against organized crime and reform of the judiciary, a more optimistic 
interpretation suggests that under favourable conditions for social pressure, material 
leverage might be unnecessary. This interpretation implies that the EU might still 
have some hope of reversing democratic backsliding when faced with a pro-EU 
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leadership with illiberal tendencies, but conversely, the EU’s influence on Eurosceptic 
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